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SHOULD THE SAFETY OF EMPLOYEES AND TRAVELLERS ON RAILROADS BE PROMOTED BY LEGISLATION?

BY JOHN J. ESCH, MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

WHEN the combined losses of both the Japanese and Russian armies for the five days of awful fighting, from August 26th to the fall of Liao-Yang, was announced to the world as amounting, in killed and wounded, to over 30,000 men, all the world shuddered. When the Interstate Commerce Commission, in its last Annual Report, made public the fact that, for the year ending June 30th, 1903, the passengers and employees killed and injured on the railroads of the United States amounted to a frightful total of 49,531, the statement excited little comment. Wreck has followed wreck with such regularity, during the last twelve months, as to make the reports of them in the daily press no longer sensational, but rather commonplace. This deplorable record of casualties has been on the increase for years; and, for the year ending March 3rd, 1904, it shows 427 passengers killed, 8,006 injured, 3,479 employees killed and 43,025 injured, making a grand total of 54,937, being greater by almost 6,000 than the losses which resulted from the three days' fighting at Gettysburg. It is a concrete illustration such as this which makes us alive to the situation, and inspires the inquiry: "What can and what ought to be done about it?"

As about eighty-four per cent. of the casualties on railroads occur among the employees, and as the coupling of cars and the falling from and riding upon cars have been largely responsible for the deaths and injuries among the employees, Congress was appealed to by them to enact safety-appliance laws for their protection. The agitation began in 1888 by the adoption of resolu-

tions by the Railroad Commissioners of the country, at a meeting held at Washington in the spring of that year, and this was followed up by a petition, signed by about 10,000 members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen, asking the Interstate Commerce Commission to take steps to bring about "the adoption of automatic couplers and brakes on freight-cars used on the railroads of the United States, and strongly appealing to the Commission to urge upon Congress the necessity of national legislation, that the terrible slaughter of brakemen on the railroads of the country might be diminished."

With the record of 2,000 employees killed and more than 20,000 injured for the year ending June 30th, 1889, with resolutions adopted by all the Grand Lodges of the Railroad Brotherhoods appealing for help, President Harrison was so much impressed that, on December 3rd, 1889, he sent a special message to Congress urging remedial legislation in these words: "It is a reproach to civilization that any class of American workmen, in the pursuit of a necessary and useful vocation, should be subjected to a peril of life and limb as great as that of a soldier in time of war."*

As about forty per cent. of the casualties among employees resulted from coupling cars, or setting brakes, Congress first directed its attention to legislation which would lessen if not obviate these occasions of danger and loss. As a result, the act of March 2nd, 1893, was passed, which sought to relieve brakemen from the necessity of going on top of or between cars, by requiring all railroads engaged in interstate commerce to equip their cars with automatic couplers, grab-irons or handholds on the ends or sides, and power or train brakes on their locomotives, "with a power driving-wheel brake, and appliances for operating the train-brake system."

Prior to the passage of the above act, various railroad managers, with commendable enterprise and actuated by humane motives, had begun of their own accord to apply different kinds of automatic couplers and brakes on the cars of their respective lines; but trainmen soon discovered that it was as dangerous to use diverse devices as it had been to use the old link and pin. Uniformity of device and of height of draw-bar, not only on each railroad system, but on all systems engaged in interstate traffic,

* O'Neill's Report, First Session Forty-second Congress.

was found necessary. Such uniformity could only come through Congressional action. The above act, therefore, authorized the American Railway Association through its experts to recommend a standard height of draw-bar for freight-cars for each of the several gauges in use in the United States.

To further safeguard brakemen or trainmen, and to prevent the necessity of their going on top of the cars, day or night, or in any weather, Congress, by an act approved March 2nd, 1903, required that not less than fifty per cent. of the cars in a train operated with power or train brakes "shall have their brakes used and operated by the engineer of the locomotive drawing such train, and all power-braked cars in such trains which are associated together with said fifty per centum shall have their brakes so used and operated." The act of March 2nd, 1893, originally limited the commencement of its operation to January 1st, 1898, but the time was subsequently extended to August 1st, 1900. The act of March 2nd, 1903, became operative on September 1st, 1903. Anticipating the former law, some of the leading roads began installing the safety appliances which it prescribed shortly after its passage. As these are the only statutes enacted by Congress to promote the safety of railroad employees, it is pertinent to inquire whether they have been successful or not. If successful, Congress, in view of the deplorable disasters of the last twelve months, might wisely undertake legislation to promote the safety of passenger traffic.

Statistics filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission show, making a comparison by years, "that, while the number killed and injured compared with the total employees has changed very little, the proportionate number of trainmen killed by coupling and uncoupling was reduced one-half between 1893 and 1896, a slight increase over 1896 being shown for 1900; and the number injured, decreased one-fifth between 1893 and 1896, was reduced one-half between 1893 and 1900. A like change of proportion is to be noted for switchmen, flagmen, etc. Deaths by falling from trains and engines have been materially decreased, but injuries from that cause have remained about the same. . . . On the whole it may be claimed, then, that the Federal law of 1893 has had a decided effect in decreasing accidents in the departments to which it applies."*

*Industrial Commission, Vol. 19, pages 914-915.

Notwithstanding these satisfactory results, the fact that for the twelve months ending March 31st, 1904, there were 104 trainmen killed and 1,358 wounded, in coupling and uncoupling cars, indicates that the acts of Congress passed for the benefit of trainmen have not had full fruition. While some allowance should be made for the enormous increase in freight traffic since 1900, which has resulted in the employment of many inexperienced men, Government inspectors report that there has been a lax compliance with the provisions of the safety-appliance law on the part of many railroad officials; that, while standard brakes and couplers may have been fully installed, there has been neglect in keeping them in constant repair, especially as to the gauging of couplers, the uncoupling apparatus, the retaining valve on the air-brakes, and the slighting of repairs on foreign cars.

That the fullest protection to trainmen as intended by Congress may be attained, the Government inspection force, now consisting of only fifteen men, should be largely increased. The inspectors should have power to peremptorily forbid the use of cars, engines or trains not fully equipped as required by law, and the railroads themselves should increase their repair and instruction crews. These things being done, the safety-appliance law will more fully justify itself, and the number of trainmen killed and injured annually will be reduced to a minimum.

Thus far, the safety of trainmen only has been considered. The results of but a short operation of the safety-appliance law have so largely reduced the casualties among trainmen, by obviating the necessity of their going between or on top of the cars, that it may next be asked: Can their safety be further promoted by legislation safeguarding them, as well as switch-tenders and other employees, against collisions and derailments, from which causes, for the twelve months ending March 31st, 1904, there were 848 killed and 5,839 injured? Whatever legislation would protect trainmen against collisions and derailments would likewise protect baggagemen, expressmen, railway mail-clerks and the traveling public. Such legislation, therefore, if reasonable and practicable, affecting millions of our people, as it would, is worthy of most careful consideration.

Such legislation should have two objects; first, to afford safety against carelessness, forgetfulness, lack of discipline or faults of omission in general; second, to afford safety in spite of such

carelessness, forgetfulness, lack of discipline and faults of omission. In connection with the first object, a study of the "Quarterly Accident Bulletins" of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for the twelve months ending March 31st, 1904, being the last statistics obtainable, shows:

Nine collisions, with a total of 38 killed and 35 injured, and property loss of \$77,770, caused by excessive hours on duty, and the falling asleep of engine-men, flagmen or operators:

Twelve collisions, with a total of 7 killed and 79 injured, and property loss of \$69,255, caused by the employment of young or inexperienced men;

Twelve collisions, with a total of 47 killed and 223 injured, and property loss of \$224,924, caused by the misreading of train orders by engine-men and conductors;

Thirteen collisions, with a total of 72 killed and 208 injured, and property loss of \$107,037, caused by ignoring signals and disobedience of orders on the part of engine-men, conductors and brakemen.

To the above classification of causes of railroad collisions and derailments may be added those resulting from forgetfulness of orders, misunderstandings as to the right to the track, "overlooking a train," mistakes of operators and despatchers in reading, transmitting or delivering orders. From these latter causes, during the months of April, May and June, 1903, alone, 33 deaths and 260 injuries resulted.

The writer believes that a Federal law, supplemented by State enactments, should be passed, prohibiting, by means of severe penalties, railroad companies from requiring trainmen, or other employees connected with the operation of trains, to work continuously for an excessive number of hours. No demand of traffic, however urgent, should deprive passengers of the service of alert, wakeful and attentive operatives. For like reasons, mere boys should be prohibited from being employed as operators; and men with little or no experience, and ignorant of their duties or of the road, should be prohibited from being employed as flagmen, engine-men, brakemen, or conductors. A thorough apprenticeship, for a specified term, with rigorous tests and examinations, should precede employment, while color-blindness and drunkenness on duty should bar or terminate it.

It may be difficult, if not impossible, to legislate against the

misreading or disobedience of orders, ignoring of signals, and many other causes of railroad accidents. Federal legislation might make some of these acts criminal and punishable with fines and imprisonment, but State laws now render these punishable under different degrees of manslaughter. Ultimately, the best remedy lies in a stricter enforcement of discipline on the part of the officials of the railroads themselves. To lay off an engine-man for a month or two for ignoring or running past a signal, even when no loss results, or a conductor for misreading an order, is not a punishment, but a vacation. This stricter discipline, promoting, as it will, the safety of life and limb, should be enforced irrespective of the demands of labor-unions in behalf of their members, on the one hand, or the officious interference of railroad officials, on the other.

The employees on American railroads are intelligent, capable and well organized. The officials who manage and operate these roads are ambitious, resourceful and, as a rule, progressive; and yet, to both, a record of such numerous and costly wrecks as have happened within a year should come as a reproach. A few of the most disastrous wrecks, with causes, are here set forth:

December 23rd, 1903, near Connellsville, Pa., 65 killed and 4 wounded. The track was obstructed by timbers which had fallen from a car insecurely loaded.

December 27th, 1903, near Grand Rapids, Mich., 18 killed and 57 injured. The engine-man passed a station at which he should have stopped for a despatcher's order. He claimed that the signal had been blown out by a high wind.

January 6th, 1904, near Topeka, Kansas, 18 killed and 37 injured. The train passed the station without stopping. The conductor and engine-man did not correctly identify a freight-train met at the station.

July 12th, 1904, at Midvale, N. J., 17 killed and 50 injured. A collision between passenger and excursion trains, caused by a tower-man's lowering his signal too soon.

July 13th, 1904, at Glenwood, Ill., 24 killed and 72 wounded. The passenger-train collided with a freight-train which should have remained on a side track.

August 8th, 1904, near Eden, Col., 100 killed (estimated). A bridge over a dry run gave way as a result of a sudden flood.

September 24th, 1904, near Newmarket, Tenn., 62 killed and

over 100 injured. The crew of the westbound train failed to carry out its orders to meet an eastbound train at a given station.

To these instances might be added scores of minor collisions and derailments, resulting in death and injury to hundreds, and in property losses of over ten millions for the year. Compared with the casualties on English, German, French and Austrian railroads, this record is humiliating, even after full allowance has been made for our greater mileage, more rapid extension of lines, heavier freight traffic and lack of public supervision. But no comparison in the end fixes standards. Neither our railroad officials nor the men they employ should be content until, to the best system in the world, there has been added the best management; and, if some roads have not enough enterprise or initiative to bring about such a consummation, legislation should furnish the spur.

The ideal railway line contemplates the use of the double-track or, what is better, the four-track system. On such a system, head-on or butting collisions, which for the year ending March 31st, 1904, numbered 1,040 and resulted in deaths to 320 and injury to 2,792, would become rare, if not impossible. Such collisions, because of the greater speed and momentum of the colliding trains, entailed for the same year about one-third more deaths and injuries than rear-end collisions, although there were 862 more of the latter. It would be idle, and in some cases ruinous and impracticable, to compel by legislation, either State or national, the construction of double-track or multiple-track systems. That is an improvement which time, increase of business and enterprise must be left to bring about.

The legislation thus far suggested as practicable and necessary for the safety of employees and the travelling public would not entail much expense upon the roads, beyond such expense as would follow an increase in the number of the force; but the compulsory installation by law of the so-called "block-signal system," as an efficient aid to the safety of travel, would mean large expenditure. In this connection, it is first necessary to determine whether this system has proven itself to be efficient, and, if so, whether through Congressional action the railroads of the country should be obliged to install it at such times and with such rapidity and on such portions of the line as Congress might prescribe.

The block-signal system is no new device. Progressive roads

in this country and abroad have made use of it for years. There are at the present over thirty thousand miles, equal to about one-seventh of the total mileage, of American roads equipped with it, embracing the parts of most roads where freight and passenger traffic is heaviest. Ever since Judge Cooley was Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that Commission has called attention to the efficacy of the block or space system in promoting the safety of railroad travel, and has repeatedly urged legislation to install it. The argument has recently been made that "the installation of the block-signal system on nearly thirty thousand miles of the busiest railways of the United States fails to show any appreciable effect in reducing the total of casualties." Granting this to be true, who can state how many more casualties there might have been had such system not been installed. For the year ending June 30th, 1902, ten out of eleven of the worst collisions occurred on roads not using the block system. Great Britain has been making use of it universally for years past, and to its use may be largely ascribed the remarkable fact that not a single passenger was killed in train accidents in 1901, and only six in 1902. The slow but voluntary extension of this system by some of the leading roads in this country is the best evidence of its efficiency. No system, however perfect, whether automatic or otherwise, can wholly eliminate the human factor in the problem of safety. Trainmen will forget, flagmen and tower-men will fall asleep, repair-men will become negligent, officials will relax discipline, in short some one will blunder; and yet this system is the most practicable method thus far put in use to insure safety.

So satisfactory has been the use of the block-signal system that the Interstate Commerce Commission has felt warranted in recommending to Congress for passage the draft of a bill requiring its use. Recognizing the cost of installation, the bill extends the time of installation over a period of years, that portion of a given line with the heaviest traffic being required to be first attended to. For the purposes of the proposed legislation, the Commission holds "the block system to mean the methods and rules by means of which the movement of railroad trains (cars or engines) may be regulated in such manner that an interval of space of absolute length may, at all times, be maintained between the rear end of a train and the forward end of the train next following."*

* Interstate Commerce Commission, 17 Annual Rept., page 344.

As the double or multiple tracks render head-on or butting collisions less probable, the block system has had the same effect in regard to rear-end collisions. As to the former, legislation to force installation would be in many instances ruinous and unreasonable; as to the latter, it would be wise and ultimately profitable. In support of any law which promotes safety, but which imposes large expenditures on the railroads, there should be offset the lessened costs and damages resulting from the lessened number of wrecks. For the fiscal year ending 1903, the loss from collisions and derailments, exclusive of litigated damages, amounted to over nine and one-half million dollars. With semaphores costing from fifty to seventy-five dollars apiece, wiring twenty-five to thirty-five dollars per mile, and signal-men's cabins five hundred dollars each, many miles of road could annually be fitted out with the block system out of the damage annually sustained by the railroads of the country. The writer firmly believes in the necessity and efficacy of this system and in legislation, both State and Federal, which will require its installation.

The second object of legislation, as already stated, is to provide safety in spite of carelessness, forgetfulness, lack of discipline or faults of omission, and, it might be added, in spite of defects of roadways, equipment and of unforeseen obstructions. This object can be attained by requiring baggage, express, mail, smoking, chair, and tourist cars—in fact, all cars except sleepers—to be so strongly built as to prevent telescoping and destruction by fire in case of collision or derailment or other accidents. It is a well-known fact that, in the average wreck, the passengers in the smoking-car and in the so-called “day coaches” suffer most. In all collisions the casualties are almost wholly confined to these cars and coaches; and, even in rear-end collisions, the force of impact, transmitted through the sleepers, spends itself upon them. The Associated Press reports of some of the worst wrecks in recent years fully attest the truth of these statements.

In the awful wreck at Chatsworth, Illinois, August 10th, 1887, in which 85 were killed, “ten cars, being telescoped, were piled across and on top of the two engines, but no one in the sleepers was hurt.”

In the wreck near Tiffin, Ohio, January 4th, 1887, in which 19 were killed and 24 injured, “the crash came, telescoping the coaches and piling them upon each other.”

In the wreck near White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, December 28th, 1889, in which 11 were killed and 25 injured, "all killed were in the smoking-car, which was telescoped by another car, every person in the car being killed."

But we can find abundant confirmation in the more important wrecks which have occurred within a year, and which have already been referred to. In the wreck near Connellsville, December 23rd, 1903, "nearly all killed were in the smoking-car. The two Pullman coaches had their trucks knocked from under them, but did not suffer damage otherwise, and none of the passengers were seriously injured."

In the wreck near Grand Rapids, Mich., December 27th, 1903, "the trains met with a terrific crash, the baggage and smoking car on each train being instantly reduced to kindling-wood. . . . No person occupying cars other than the baggage and smoking cars, with very few exceptions, were seriously injured."

In the wreck at Topeka, Kansas, January 6th, 1904, "the smoking-car was overturned and pushed through the car behind it. All the passenger-coaches except the last two Pullman coaches were piled up in a heap."

In the wreck near Midvale, N. J., July 12th, 1904, "the engine of the regular train pierced the rear car of the excursion train the greater part of its length, and drove the front end of the car into the car ahead. The killed and injured were in these two cars."

In the recent bad wreck near Glenwood, Ill., "the engine and baggage-cars of the passenger-train went clear through the freight and were piled up in a heap of wreckage on the further side of the switch. The first coach of the picnic train plunged into the wreckage, and buried itself in a mass of kindling-wood under the demolished baggage-car. Nearly all of the passengers of the first coach were caught beneath the mass of debris."

In the wreck near Newmarket, Tenn., one of the worst on record, "the second coach ploughed its way into a bank in such a manner that the other cars were jammed into it and, pushed in by the weight of heavy Pullmans, were crushed like eggshells."

This monotonously doleful tale of death and disaster could be prolonged, but enough has been given to make reasonable the following conclusions: first, the position of the lighter cars and coaches between the heavy sleepers and the still heavier loco-

tive subjects them to being telescoped in case of collisions; second, if no change in the construction is to be made, such cars and coaches should be placed in the rear of the train, as is already the practice on some limited trains on certain roads; third, baggage, mail, express, smoking, chair, and tourist cars, and all day coaches, as at present constructed, are too frail to resist the impact of collisions; fourth, the crushing of such cars increases the danger from fire, which adds the only element lacking to make the complete holocaust.

The weak construction of the average mail, baggage, express, and passenger coaches being the *locus injuriæ* of most casualties in case of wrecks, the writer, at the close of the last session of Congress, introduced a bill to compel common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to strengthen the construction of their cars. By its terms, such cars were required to have strong, heavy underframes, with end and side sills of steel or other metal, and with not less than four girders or sleepers of steel running the entire length of the underframe, including the end platforms. The sills and sleepers were to be covered over with a steel floor of one-fourth-inch plates. The vestibule and framework of the superstructure were also to be made of steel or other metal. The purpose was to require the construction of a car whose floor and upper framework, including vestibules, would have the strength and rigidity of the modern sleeper, without its weight, and which, with girders of steel extending under strongly vestibuled end platforms, would prevent telescoping.

Steel passenger-cars are not unheard of. They have been largely used on the Continent of Europe, steel underframes being in common use. The Illinois Central Railroad Company, after three years of experimenting, has just built at its own shops eight steel passenger-coaches for its suburban service at Chicago. These coaches are giving excellent satisfaction, being of great strength and rigidity, with from six thousand to ten thousand pounds less of weight than cars of equal size of wood construction.* The Monon route has been running on its lines, for some time past, a steel postal-car. To prevent a repetition of the recent Paris Subway horror, the Interborough Rapid Transit Company, of New York, has ordered for its use 200 pressed-steel cars, all the furnishings of which are to be of metal.

* "Railway and Engineering Review," Sept. 5, 1903, page 601.

Steel cars, aside from their unflammability, have points of advantage over the ordinary type of sleeper in that, with equal if not greater strength, they have less weight, and hence, in case of collision, less momentum; and yet, the degree of safety enjoyed by passengers in sleepers has been remarkable. During the three years prior to September, 1903, in which there were accommodated by the Pullman Company 32,693,341 railway passengers in all parts of the United States, 6 passengers were killed (these casualties occurring in two disastrous railway wrecks in different parts of the country), 4 were seriously and 64 slightly injured.

In reply to this statement, it may be argued that, as sleepers are ordinarily placed in the rear of trains, the force of collision expends itself before they are reached. While this is largely true in butting collisions, the argument avails nothing in rear-end collisions, where the sleeper is first to receive the brunt of impact. As there were, for the twelve months ending March 31st last, only 1,050 butting and 1,882 rear-end collisions, we might expect at least an equal if not greater number of casualties in the latter class of collisions; and yet 320 were killed and 2,792 injured in the butting collisions, while only 205 were killed and 2,063 injured in the rear-end collisions. The fact that the train collided with in rear-end collisions is either stationary or moving in the same direction with the colliding train lessens the force of impact and, therefore, the danger. This fact, added to the greater strength and resisting power of the sleepers in the rear of the train, accounts for the difference in the number of casualties between rear-end and head-on collisions. Moreover, accidents have been reported where the force of a rear-end collision has left the sleepers intact and their occupants uninjured, but transmitted itself through them to the day coaches with crushing and fatal effect.

Objection to steel cars may be made further on the ground that, with no light cars to act as cushions or buffers to deaden the impact, the shock, especially in a butting collision, in coming to a dead stop, would kill or maim more passengers than under present conditions. In the opinion of the "*Scientific American*," "this point is very much open to question. The passengers would be badly bruised and limbs would be broken, perhaps; but there would be none of the grinding, crushing and tearing of limb from limb that mark the telescoping of two cars."*

* "*Scientific American*," Feb. 6, 1904, page 117.

The last objection to steel cars on passenger-trains would arise on the ground of their cost. There are at present about thirty-nine thousand passenger-cars in service in the United States, valued at an average of five thousand dollars each, or a total of one hundred and ninety-five million dollars. Once equipped for such work, it is believed that the car-shops of this country could build steel cars for less than nine thousand dollars apiece, the cost of a wooden car. When life and limb are at stake, the question of cost should not receive too much consideration. In view of the fact that the net income of ninety-eight per cent. of the railroad mileage of the United States for the year ending June 30th, 1903, was \$734,709,435, of which sum \$91,162,712 was surplus and \$159,310,010 was paid out in dividends,* an expenditure of two hundred or even three hundred millions of dollars for the construction of steel cars for passenger-trains, extended over a term of five or ten years, would not be unreasonable nor oppressive. The damages paid by railroads of this country for the last ten years, as a result of deaths and injuries received in wrecks, and for litigation arising therefrom, would go a great way toward equipping the roads of the country with such cars.

Steel freight-cars are already being used on many roads because of their greater strength, capacity and safety. Ought not like considerations to justify improvement in cars which carry human freight? It was a pressed-steel freight-car loaded with coal which rammed and crushed a passenger-car near Indianapolis about a year ago, killing 18 and injuring 25 Purdue College students. The freight-car was little injured, the coal not at all.

The railway postal-cars, being placed, as a rule, just behind the locomotive, occupy the position of the greatest danger. As there are over fifteen thousand United States Postal Clerks, these clerks annually furnish their quota, and it is a large one, to the list of railway casualties. The National Association of Postal Clerks has repeatedly appealed for cars having at least steel underframes. Under existing law, the Postmaster-General can prescribe the specifications for the framing of postal-cars; but the specifications which have recently been approved by the Post-Office Department differ but little from the specifications which have been followed for years past. Reform in car construction might well be inaugurated by the Government in requiring here-

* Interstate Commerce Com., 17 Annual Rept., page 108.

after, in the building of all its mail-cars, the use of steel underframes and steel studding, rafters and carlines in the superstructure. Especially ought this to be the case in view of the fact that the Government annually pays for the use of the car itself, its original cost of construction and, in many instances, more too.

In conclusion, while "the human factor in railroading constitutes the greatest peril," and without the most rigid and unrelaxing discipline the best appliances will not insure absolute safety, nevertheless I strongly urge that wise legislation will materially reduce the number of casualties now so discreditable to American railway management.

Such legislation should have for its object (1) the increase of the inspection force of the Government and the repair and instruction crews of the railroad companies, with increase of powers to Government inspectors; (2) the prevention of excessive hours of continuous labor on the part of railroad employees; (3) the prevention of the employment of youthful or incompetent or inexperienced men; (4) the compulsory installation of the most approved block-signal system; (5) the change of specifications by the Government for all mail-cars from wood to steel; (6) the compulsory use of passenger-cars with steel underframes and steel framework for superstructure and vestibules.

The wise manager anticipates the needs of the travelling public, and, in so doing, increases the patronage of his road. Legislation may not be needed for such as he, but it is needed to whip and spur to action those who lag behind.

JOHN J. ESCH.